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ABSTRACT 
Should research on the possible genetic components of human intelligence be carried out? I first 
try to provide some general guidelines as to whether any particular piece of research should be 
undertaken and then consider the specific example of the ethics of genetic research on 
intelligence. The history of the debate on intelligence does not make one very optimistic that the 
fruits of such research would be used wisely. However, there are indications that people's 
understanding of the nature of inheritance may be improving and it could be that such research 
might have significant benefits. It is worth remembering than the condition phenylketonuria, a 
genetic disease in any useful sense of the term, and one that leads to mental retardation (i.e. very 
low intelligence), is now wholly preventable, and indeed very largely prevented, through 
environmental intervention. 
The Ethics of Genetic Research on Intelligence 
Should we carry out or allow to be carried out research that aims to determine the genetic 
underpinnings, if any, of human intelligence? The question is both controversial and timely. It is 
controversial not only because there are arguments both for and against such a research 
programme but also because there are many who, for a number of reasons which will be 
discussed further below, deny the validity or appropriateness of the question. It is timely 
because, as is widely known, the rapid progress made on the Human Genome Project and other 
fronts of molecular biology means that the possibility of such a research programme is already 
with us.
1
 Indeed, it can be argued that research in this area is already beginning, albeit in a 
somewhat covert fashion. 
The main aim of this paper is not to provide a definitive answer to the question of whether 
research on the genetic basis of intelligence (understood throughout this paper as referring 
specifically to human - rather than artificial or animal non-human - intelligence) should be 
forbidden, permitted or advocated. Rather it is to attempt to spell out the various relevant 
considerations that should be taken into account before decisions are made. 
I begin in Section I by noting that in general there are ethical arguments for and against doing 
any particular piece of research. In Section II I look at what ethical arguments about research on 
the possibility of a genetic basis to human sexual orientation can tell us about the ethics of 
equivalent research on intelligence. Section III presents, as an analogy, a sort of thought 
experiment which consists of a set of arguments against carrying out research into short-
sightedness. Section IV describes specific arguments against carrying out research on the 
genetics of intelligence. Section V describes specific arguments in favour of such research. 
Finally, Section VI tentatively presents a conclusion. 
 
IA. GENERAL ETHICAL ARGUMENTS FOR DOING A PARTICULAR PIECE OF 
RESEARCH 
I can conceive of four main general ethical reasons for allowing a particular piece of research to 
go ahead. They overlap to some extent but it may be useful to consider them separately. These 
general arguments, though obviously not their specific formulations, are meant to hold whatever 
the actual proposed piece of research is; for example, it might be research into the safety of 
bridges, the structure of the electron or the mating habits of a Peruvian beetle. 
 
Arguments against banning things 
One argument for allowing a particular piece of research is the standard one that in a 
(relatively/partial) liberal democracy one needs strong arguments before one bans things. One of 
the lessons of history is that in earlier times practices have been banned which now most of us 
consider appropriate. Many of these are to do with gender or sex - for instance, the admission of 
women to universities and the de-criminalisation of same-sex relationships - but not all. For 
example, we now allow non-property owning people to vote at elections. In those cases where 
countries have decided to ban practices permitted in previous time, e.g. slavery and torture, this 
is usually because the practices are now widely considered intrinsically unacceptable for reasons 
to do with respect of persons. 
In many societies nowadays, the major reasons for banning things are on the grounds that the 
activity would or might harm others - e.g. various laws on the control of gun ownership - or on 
the grounds of distributive justice - e.g. laws about having to pay taxes. Indeed, it is noteworthy 
just how much we allow people to do even when we know it would, in at least some senses, be 
better for them if they didn't - e.g. it would be better for most people, from a narrow, physical 
health perspective, if they didn't smoke cigarettes. We allow adults to smoke precisely because 
we choose / prefer to live in societies where, roughly speaking, the granting of autonomy is felt 
to be a higher good than the imposition of beneficence. 
 
Autonomy of scientists and funders 
A particular form of the 'Arguments against banning things' reason is that scientists and funders, 
along with other individuals and institutions, should have autonomy. This argument is not to 
assume naively that scientists or funders exist independently of societies, free to choose without 
constraints their topics for study. Indeed, it may be that one of the strongest arguments for 
encouraging scientists (and funders) to believe that they are acting autonomously is simply the 
consequentialist one that many people, including, I suspect, academics such as research scientists 
and moral philosophers, produce their best work when they believe that they are doing what they 
want to do. 
 
Intrinsic quest for knowledge 
My personal experience is that quite a few scientists when asked why it would be right to carry 
out a particular piece of research simply reply along the lines that is would be 'interesting' or 'it 
hasn't been done before'. Now such answers do not fall entirely under the 'Intrinsic quest for 
knowledge' heading. After all, the scientists in question may, consciously or not, be thinking that 
a new area for study may make it easier to get funding, may lead to publications in prestigious 
journals or may increase their chances of receiving adulation / admiration either from their peers 
or from society in general (in the UK we still give our best scientists, once they have done their 
finest work, knighthoods, send them to The House of Lords or suchlike). 
Nevertheless, despite the dangers in uncritically accepting the 'Intrinsic quest for knowledge' 
argument, it may have some validity as a description of the motivation behind certain pieces of 
research. For whatever reasons, a significant number of scientists believe they have almost a 
moral duty to investigate new areas for study - the 'Because it's there' phenomenon.
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This is not, of course, to accept the normative validity of the 'Because it's there' argument as a 
reason for carrying out a particular piece of research. Indeed, under the extreme (used 
descriptively rather than necessarily pejoratively) viewpoint advocated by Peter Unger, the great 
majority of Western adults (with the possible exception, apparently, of well-established moral 
philosophers of about Unger's age or older) have a moral obligation (certainly, once they have 
read his book) to abandon their current professions and channel all their efforts into the relief of 
world poverty by diverting funds (whether by hard work, theft or almost any other means) from 




Usefulness of information/ideas gained 
For most people, including the general public, by far the most significant reason for carrying out 
a piece of research is that the information gained or ideas generated with be of worth, helping to 
increase the sum total of human happiness or produce some other desirable benefits. This is most 
clearly the case when we are talking about research in the applied sciences, such as medicine, 
agriculture and engineering. 
 
IB. GENERAL ETHICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST DOING A PARTICULAR PIECE 
OF RESEARCH 
Four main, overlapping arguments against doing a particular piece of research can be envisaged. 
 
It would be wrong in itself even to want to do the research 
We can imagine pieces of research where most (or, at any rate, a significant proportion of) 
people would consider it wrong for someone even to want to do the research. An instance would 
be research on more effective ways of torturing people. This is not to say that arguments cannot 
be advanced to permit or even require such research (a standard example, rarely faced in reality 
but constantly occupying the thoughts of some moral philosophers, would be when the health of 
millions of people depends on one individual being 'persuaded' to reveal the location of a single 
missile site). It is enough for us to admit the existence of reputable ethical arguments (Kantian 
ones, most obviously) that would preclude such research even if not everyone accepts the 
validity of those admittedly reputable ethical arguments. 
 The process of the research itself would have unacceptable consequences 
We can imagine cases where carrying out the research programme itself would be wrong because 
of the direct consequences for those involved in the research. An example is provided by Stanley 
Milgram's classic work on obedience.
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 Despite the undoubted worth of the study, which fulfils 
all four of the criteria in Section 1A above, the codes of many psychological societies would 
nowadays preclude such research from being undertaken on the grounds that the deception it 
requires of the participants is excessive. A second example may be provided by research that is 
still carried out for the intended benefit of soldiers shot in battle. To improve the operating skills 
of army surgeons, pigs are shot and then operated on by the surgeons for practice. 
 
The net consequences of the results of the research would be harmful 
One can envisage research programmes that we might conclude should not be carried out 
because they would, on balance, lead to undesired consequences. A possible example (though 
one I would find it difficult to defend in detail if hard pressed - I can only hope that its 
presentation at least clarifies the point I wish to make) might be publicly-funded research on new 
ways of breaking into locked cars. While such research might well help produce new car 
protection systems that would make it more difficult for the cars to be broken into / stolen, these 
benefits might be outweighed by the 'educational' effects of the research for inexperienced or 
inept car thieves. (Of course, car companies undertake such research privately and guard their 
findings to a greater extent than a publicly-funded body might be able to.) 
 
The money could be spent better elsewhere 
A final and very significant argument against a proposed piece of research is simply that, 
whatever its merits, given that research funds are limited, the money could be spent better 
elsewhere. This argument has an undoubted validity and academics in general, not just research 
scientists, are all too familiar with it. Indeed, a large part of the skill of awarding research grants 
is to know where to target one's funding so that there is a good chance of the research's aims 
being realised (obviously a probabilistically-based utilitarian argument could firm up what is 
meant here by 'good'). 
 
II. WHAT CAN RESEARCH ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A GENETIC BASIS TO 
HUMAN SEXUAL ORIENTATION TELL US ABOUT THE ETHICS OF EQUIVALENT 
RESEARCH ON INTELLIGENCE? 
Udo Schuklenk has argued with his co-authors against genetic research on sexual orientation.
5
 
His arguments are worth examining in the context of this paper as there are significant parallels 
between genetic research on sexual orientation and genetic research on intelligence. In both cases 
the debate is timely and in both cases there have been arguments advanced, often with 
considerable passion, on both sides. 
Schuklenk advances a number of reasons as to why research into the genetics of sexual 
orientation is wrong. For a start he points out that lesbians, gay men and bisexuals are still 
subject to widespread discrimination and social disapprobation. There are large numbers of 
people, including some who research in this area, who believe that homosexuality is second-best, 
a disease or evil. Given this, their research is likely to be biased and to strengthen and perpetuate 
homophobia. Indeed, Schuklenk questions whether researchers on sexual orientation can ever 
conduct their work in a value-neutral manner given that it is the focus of widespread and intense 
interest. 
Then Schuklenk argues, as have others, that such research might end up leading to prenatal tests 
that would be used to abort fetuses that seemed to be 'homosexually predisposed'. Schuklenk 
points out that such tests might be developed and enjoy widespread use and apparent success 
even if invalid (in a descriptive rather than normative sense). For example, if a lesbian knew that 
her parents had used such a test which had erroneously proved 'negative', so allowing her to be 
born, she might well be more likely to hide her sexual orientation from them. As a result the test 
would seem to work. (I hope it is not too flippant here to mention the story of the man in South 
England who each Saturday went round the edge of his property scattering small pieces of garlic. 
On finally being asked by his neighbour 'Why?' he replied 'To keep the tigers away'. His 
neighbour rejoined 'But there are no tigers here!', to which he replied 'You see. It works!'.) 
Schuklenk goes on to demolish one argument in favour of genetic research on sexual orientation, 
namely the argument that such research can successfully counter claims that homosexuality is 
abnormal or unnatural through revealing so called gay genes. There are a number of things that 
are wrong with this argument but perhaps the most basic is that, as is very widely agreed 
nowadays among moral philosophers, none of the ways in which normality is defined validly 
direct us in the making of moral judgements. 
Before leaving Schuklenk's arguments, it is worth noting why they do not apply to genetic 
research on phenylketonuria. Phenylketonuria is a hereditary disease caused by an autosomal 
(i.e. non-sex-linked) recessive allele: the liver fails to produce the enzyme phenylalanine 
hydroxylase, so that the amino acid phenylalanine accumulates in the bloodstream instead of 
being converted to another amino acid, tyrosine.
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 This causes severe damage to the brain of the 
developing child leading to mental retardation. Until a few decades ago, adults with 
phenylketonuria were frequently institutionalised. Nowadays, though, in a large number of 
countries all new-born babies are tested by the Guthrie test to see if they have raised levels of 
phenylalanine in their blood. If they do, they are put on a diet that is low in phenylalanine and 
high in tyrosine. This allows normal brain development. Although these diets are quite 
expensive, and extremely boring for those who have to live on them throughout their childhood, 
they do allow normal brain development to take place. 
The reasons why Schuklenk's arguments do not apply to research on phenylketonuria are, first, 
that it, unlike homosexuality, is manifestly and unambiguously a disease and, secondly, that it is 
treatable for individuals with the condition, enabling them to lead far richer and more worthwhile 
lives than would otherwise have been the case. (To say this, though, is to use hindsight. At the 




III. THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH INTO SHORT-SIGHTEDNESS 
The above considerations of sexual orientation and phenylketonuria introduce, by analogy, some 
of the factors relevant to the question whether equivalent research on intelligence would be a 
good thing. Here I would like, somewhat tongue in cheek, though with the hope of making a 
valid point, to imagine that we live in a society just like the one in which we do live except for 
one feature. And that is that people are only just beginning to talk about the notion of 'short-
sightedness'. Of course, no formal tests of short-sightedness have yet been agreed upon and no 
one has spectacles or any other way of correcting short-sightedness. 
I think it is easy to imagine the arguments, in such an hypothesised society, for undertaking 
research into short-sightedness: its causes, its manifestations and so on. Here I would like to spell 
out the arguments one could imagine that might be put to counter the notion that such research 
should be undertaken. I hope the parallels with research on intelligence are sufficiently clear for 
it not to be necessary for them to be spelt out. 
For a start, we can imagine certain psychologists pointing out the methodological problems that 
exist in attempting to measure short-sightedness. After all, we should bear in mind that good 
eyesight in a laboratory or clinical setting cannot be presumed to be the same as good eyesight in 
'the real world' where life is far more complicated. 
Then there are philosophers quick to remind us that there are problems in defining short-
sightedness. In particular, we should bear in mind that what the eye sees is not the same as what 
the brain perceives. 
The pragmatists will ask what the point of the research is. After all, even if short-sightedness 
does exist and even if it can, albeit somewhat crudely, be measured, we can't do anything about 
the fact that some people are short-sighted. 
Then there are those, mainly to be found among those whose eyesight is rather good, who 
maintain that variation in short-sightedness is part of the richness of humanity. 
Others will assert that we already know that short-sightedness is due to children reading too 
much at too early an age, pointing out that convincing cross-cultural comparisons establish this 
beyond doubt. 
Then government ministers and those in charge of hospital budgets will appear on national 
television pronouncing that we won't be able to afford treatment of short-sightedness for 
everyone. 
Finally, well meaning intellectuals will form pressure groups with poorly designed web sites 
arguing that the diagnosis of short-sightedness will lead to certain people being stigmatised. It 
may, for example, preclude such people from entering certain professions or even lead, shock 
horror, to ordinary citizens having their driving licences taken away. This last fear should be 
enough to banish for decades the possibility of the research ever being funded. 
 
IV. SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST CARRYING OUT RESEARCH ON THE 
GENETICS OF INTELLIGENCE 
There are a number of specific arguments against carrying out research on the genetics of 
intelligence. For a start, a significant body of opinion maintains that the very notion of a simple 
measure of 'intelligence' is deeply problematic.
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 The argument exists at several levels. Some 
question the very notion of intelligence;
8
 some argue that there are intelligences rather than 
intelligence;
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 some admit the existence of intelligence but maintain that the problems in 
measuring it are insurmountable. In essence these arguments deny the academic worth of any 
research programme concerned with measuring intelligence. 
Then there are arguments that, while they accept the notion of simple measures of intelligence, 
deny the academic worth of research programmes concerned with the genetics of intelligence. 
Such arguments may point out the extent to which we live in an age that inappropriately reifies 
the gene,
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 or assert that no methodology can untangle the relative contributions made by the 
genes and the environments in which each of us has lived. 
Then there are the arguments from history. As is now widely accepted, attempts by previous 
generations, and more recently, to measure intelligence have all too often led to unwarranted 
prejudice and discrimination against black people, women, working class people and others.
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Historical arguments, when pointing to what we should or should not do in the future rather than 
simply commenting on what we did in the past, take various forms. In one form, it can be 
maintained that the very notions of 'intelligence' and / or 'genetics' are so tainted with racism, 
sexism and classism that, at least for the foreseeable future, it simply won't be possible to carry 
out a value-neutral study in this area. 
A somewhat different argument might be termed 'The wife of the Bishop of Worcester' 
argument. On hearing of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection, the wife of the 
Bishop of Worcester is said to have exclaimed to her husband 'Descended from apes! My dear, 
let us hope it is not so; but if it is, that it does not become generally known'. In other words, there 
are some things we might prefer (ourselves and / or others) not to know.
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 Such an argument, 
though easy to ridicule, can easily be elevated to a preference utilitarian argument. For example, 
apparently around 10% of us, in Western societies, are not the children of our presumed fathers. 
Perhaps it would be better (for us, for our presumed biological fathers, for our biological fathers, 
for our mothers, etc.) if we didn't know the truth about our own paternity. A stronger form of this 
argument might be termed 'The eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil' 
argument. In other words, it is better for us not to know certain things. For example, some would 
argue that the world would be a better place if we did not know how to split the atom. 
It is easy to propose possible reasons why it might be preferable or better for us not to know 
about the genetics of intelligence. After all, suppose the results of such research show, appear to 
show or at any rate are widely taken as showing that there is an inherited component to 
intelligence with consistent and statistically significant (even if minor) differences between the 
average intelligences of different racial groups. Suppose further that these racial differences 
correlate (at least on average) with the possession of certain alleles. Might not such knowledge 
lead, on the one side (those with high intelligence), to racism or greed (The 'It's not worth 
educating them' viewpoint) and on the other side (those with low intelligence) to people 
becoming disheartened, envious or bitter ('However hard I work, I'm not going to pass my exams 
/ get a well paid job')? 
Further, one can imagine that evidence that intelligence does have a genetic component will lead 
to an increase in prenatal testing and a consequent increase in selective terminations. Whatever 
one's views about abortion, it is easy to see such a scenario leading to less overall happiness. 
 
V SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF CARRYING OUT RESEARCH ON THE 
GENETICS OF INTELLIGENCE 
Finally, there are the various specific arguments in favour of carrying out research on the 
genetics of intelligence though it has to be said that there is a very considerable degree of 
speculation about these advantages. One such argument is the apparently chauvinistic one: 
'Research in this area will happen anyway and if we do it the consequences won't be so bad as if 
someone else does it'. This argument has appeared in connection with the possibility of human 
cloning. Such an argument doesn't seem to me to be a strong one but I could imagine situations 
in which it would have a certain force. After all, if there are significant differences between 
countries and research institutions in the quality of the research they are likely to carry out 




For a very different argument in favour of carrying out such research, suppose that the genetic 
influence on intelligence turns out to be rather small, or at any rate, typically subordinate to 
environmental influences. This might take a lot of the heat out of the argument about the genetics 
of intelligence and help us to think more carefully about whether or not we want future 
generations to be more intelligence. It might, indeed, lead to reflection on what exactly is a 
valuable life. If people decide that high intelligence does contribute to 'the good life', we might 
more critically turn our attention to ways of arriving at environments that increase intelligence. 
 
A further benefit of research in this field is that it might lead to a better understanding of gene-
environment interactions by the general public. Until recently the repeated publication in the 
non-specialist media of 'gene for ...' stories may have simply re-inforced a public equation of 
'genes' with 'inevitability'. As everyone who works in the field acknowledges, this equation is 
completely invalid: just think of phenylketonuria. Change the environment (i.e. a different diet 
during childhood) and the effect of the mutant gene disappears. Some tangential evidence in 
support of the notion that research into the genetics of intelligence (or just about any other 
human trait
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 including personality as well as diseases including psychiatric diseases) might lead 
to better public understanding comes from the accumulating evidence about the public 
understanding of science. It is encouraging to note that while the average person doesn't do very 
well on simple factual questions about science (e.g. 'Where does most of the mass of a tree come 
from?', 'Which is bigger, a cell or a gene?'), people frequently show a fine understanding of 
particular aspects of science when those particular aspects directly impinge on them.
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 It is 
possible that advances in genetics, including research on the genetics of intelligence, will lead 
people to have a better understanding of the limitations of 'the gene for ...'-type stories and that 
this will especially be the case when the genes in question are relevant for particular people. 
The above purported benefits are concerned with many people having a better understanding 
about the nature of inheritance. To most people a far more important benefit would be that the 
results of the research might enable us to find better ways of increasing people's intelligence. To 
evaluate this possible benefit involves two stages, first addressing the issue about the presumed 
connection between a person's intelligence and their quality of life; secondly, reviewing (at least, 
attempting to) the likelihood that research advances in this area would lead to increases in 
people's intelligence. 
So, first, what is the connection between a person's intelligence and their quality of life? (We are 
not, of course, examining the relationship between a person's intelligence and their worth but 
between a person's intelligence and their quality of life.) There is considerable evidence in favour 
of the common-sense notion that, at least up to a certain point, the higher a person's intelligence, 
the higher their quality of life. (The proviso 'up to a certain point' is because the evidence is, I 
suspect, stronger when comparing, say, an IQ of 70 with 100 than one of 120 with 150.) 
Certainly, in the USA a higher IQ correlates well with higher earnings, a lower likelihood of 
being arrested for a very wide range of non-traffic offences and lower prevalence of HIV 
infection.
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 Now there is more to life than having a well-paid job, staying out of prison and being 
healthy, and quantitative measures of this sort are always somewhat crude. A different approach 
is to note that not many people spend much effort trying to make themselves or their children 
less intelligent whereas a lot of people spend considerable time and money educating themselves 
and their children in ways that help them to score better on IQ tests even if this isn't their specific 
intention. Logically each of us could be content with the intelligence we have, prefer a higher 
intelligence or prefer a lower intelligence. My bet is that not many people are in the third 
category. Certainly, anyone who has ever spent much time with either retarded or profoundly 
retarded people is likely, I contend, to accept that, other things being equal, it is preferable to 
have an IQ at or around the average rather than far beneath it. 
If we accept that there is benefit in helping people to be more intelligent, how likely is it that 
research on the genetics of intelligence will help in this aim? Wouldn't it be better to carry out 
research on more effective ways of educating people or simply to forget the research and put into 
practice all we know about high quality child-rearing and teaching?
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At present it is very difficult to believe that answers to such questions can be given with much 
confidence. Advances in genomic medicine suggest that we cannot discount the possibility that 
research into the genetics of intelligence may lead to more appropriate targeted help for different 
categories of children. It is already clear that conditions associated with low intelligence, such as 
poor language development, can have genetic components.
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 The phenylketonuria example cited 
earlier illustrates not only that genes can, in the usual sense of the word, 'cause' low intelligence, 
but that understanding the biochemical reasons for this can lead to successful interventions. 
Perhaps we really will find a variety of ways of boosting the intelligence of children who would 
otherwise grow up with either generalised low intelligence or various specific learning 
difficulties such as dyslexia. And if we don't, and instead find out that we can't, at least we will 
know that we can't. 
 
V CONCLUSION 
My own judgement is that, if a decision has to be made one way or another, then the time is 
approaching when the arguments in favour of carrying out research on the genetics of 
intelligence will prevail. However, I want to emphasise the provisionality of this conclusion. In 
part this is because of existing empirical uncertainties about what such research might reveal and 
how people would react to such revelations. In part, though, it is because of the continuing 
disagreement within applied ethics as to how complicated ethical questions are to be answered 
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